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Let Us Eat Lettuce (and Spinach):
Is the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act Enough
or is an Independent Food Safety Agency Required?
Robert M. Yoke1
INTRODUCTION
O N September 14, 2006, federal officials warned consumers that an
outbreak of an E. coli strain called 0157:H7 might be linked to fresh
bagged spinach and recommended that consumers avoid eating such spinach
until more information was known.' However, the first case of E. coli was
reported on August 23rd, and it was not known until about three weeks
later that there was even an outbreak at all.3 As the amount of information
grew, it became clear that the contamination was an accident, but "' [t] here
is always a question in the back of our mind whether it may have been a
deliberate attack on the food supply.' 4 What if this had been a deliberate
bioterror attack on the food supply? Would the regulatory response system
currently in place detect it in time? How widespread could the problem
become?
This outbreak was discovered slowly and seemingly by coincidence.
The initial breakthrough indicating that there was something wrong
came from a state public health laboratory in Wisconsin.5 Officials at the
lab noticed that eight patients in the state had all contracted the same
genetic strain of E. coli at almost the exact same time.6 Recognizing the
potential danger to the public at large, they placed a message on a national
data network operated by the Centers for Disease Control (the "CDC").7
Unfortunately the message was posted on a Friday and it was not until the
i B.A. Education, 2003, Purdue University; J.D. expected 2oo8 University of Kentucky
College of Law. The Author would like to thank his wife and family for their support, and for
putting up with him during law school.
2 Gardiner Harris, U.S. Warns of Outbreak and of Eating Bag Spinach, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2oo6, at A 14.
3 Id.
4 Pattern ofE. Coli Outbreaks is Seen, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A21 (quoting Dr. David
Acheson of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition).
5 Maria L. La Ganga, A Mom Suspected Spinach; As Public Health Officials Looked for the
Source of LethalE. Coli, the Mother of Two Sick Children Began to Focus on their Salad, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 9, zoo6, at A i.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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following Monday that officials at the CDC discovered that this strain of
E. coli matched posts from several other states which had been reported in
recent weeks.' This contact, however, allowed local officials in the affected
states to begin investigating the foods consumed by those suffering from E.
coli.9 Within a couple of days the FDA had issued its warning about bagged
spinach, and a few days later officials in New Mexico had confirmed that
the strain of E. coli did, in fact, come from that bagged spinach."° Once
the bagged spinach was identified, it took less than twenty-four hours for
investigators to identify the producer and narrow down their search to nine
farms in California." Eventually investigators found the same strain of
E. coli in cattle feces near a Salinas Valley farm that produced the bagged
spinach."2 And while E. coli outbreaks are certainly not unusual, even in
leafy vegetables as opposed to beef, this was the first time an outbreak had
been traced to a specific farm where it was grown. 3
While the E. coli outbreaks in bagged spinach and loose leaf lettuce
have been proven not to be the result of any terror attacks, it remains that
the increased authority granted under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (the "Bioterrorism
Act") was designed to bring more food establishments in line with
regulations in the event that there is such an attack. The response of the
government to these rccent threats can provide us with some indication
of the likelihood that an actual bioterror attack could be identified and
contained quickly. And if the current increased regulatory authority would
not allow for such a quick and efficient government response, would the
proposed Food Safety Administration allow for such a response?
The purpose of this Note is to examine the procedures that were
established under the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
and compare the provisions which increased the regulatory authority of the
FDA with the provisions of the bill that would create a new, independent
Food Safety Administration. The main thrust will be whether the existing
system is working and then whether the new agency would likely create
a better system that would substantially increase the protection of the
food supply. Part I will examine the existing authority of the FDA as
defined in title III of the Bioterror Act. Part II will describe some critiques
8 Id.
9 Id.
so Id.
i i Annys Shin, At E. Coli Hunt's End, a Safety Standards Gap, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2oo6,
at Di.
12 Annys Shin, E. Coli Detected Near Spinach; Cattle Manure Within a Mile of California
Fields, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2oo6, at Di.
13 Id. ("Though last month's E. Coli outbreak was the 2oth in 1o years linked to leafy
greens and the ninth traced to the Salinas Valley, investigators have never found a specific
source of contamination, which made [these] findings unusual").
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of the current agency system and the proposal for a unified Food Safety
Administration. Part III compares the relevant portions of both the current
and proposed systems to explore whether the relevant changes in the
proposed system would have a real effect. The Note concludes that the
procedures in title III of the Bioterrorism Act are working as designed and
that from this narrow perspective a change to a unified agency would be
little more than a reorganization.
I. THE CURRENT LEVEL OF AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE FDA UNDER TITLE
III OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ACT OF 2002
A. The FDA's Report to Congress on the E. Coli Outbreak in Bagged Spinach
On November 15, 2006, Robert Brackett, the director of the FDA
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, testified before Congress
regarding the recent E. coli outbreak in bagged spinach. His testimony
began by explaining why ready-to-eat vegetables might be harmful to
unsuspecting consumers. 14 The great potential for contamination comes
from the combination of growing these products in fields and the fact that
they "are often consumed without cooking or other treatments that could
eliminate pathogens if present.".'" In order to detect an outbreak like the
spinach outbreak, the CDC actively searches for evidence of outbreaks
and provides this information to the FDA or USDA to evaluate and notify
the public.' 6 In this case, once the outbreak located in the spinach was
detected and evaluated, the FDA began on-site inspections of farms in the
Salinas Valley to investigate the source of the E. coli and the extent of the
contaminated products. 7 To further refine their investigation to determine
the precise source of the contamination, the investigators took samples of
facilities, water, the surrounding environment, and reviewed nearby animal
management practices." In conducting this investigation, and similar
investigations following other food contamination outbreaks, the FDA
began issuing various documents to producers which provide information
on appropriate practices for handling and growing produce. 9 In this way,
the FDA encourages producers to engage in practices that minimize the
14 Food Safety: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, i o9th
Cong. (2oo6), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2oo6/foodsafetyl i5.html (statement of
Robert E. Brackett, Ph.D., Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and
Drug Administration).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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potential for outbreaks. Additionally, the FDA is conducting research on
better detection methods and the potential of treating the products before
they are shipped to prevent disease from spreading."0
But is the combination of continued research and voluntary standards
enough to protect against a potential bioterror attack on the food supply? It
certainly seems that research on treating products before they are shipped
for food-borne diseases is potentially an effective way to ensure against
attacks. Is the fact that this is the first time that an E. coli outbreak caused
by leafy vegetables was traced to a particular farm in a known problem
area a sign of improvement or merely a chance happening? In essence, did
we get lucky in finding the true source or are the increased regulations of
the FDA and other agencies progressing to a level that create a safe food
supply? If the increased regulations are not working, is there a need for a
single food safety agency? Since this outbreak occurred after the final rules
of the FDA were promulgated according to the Bioterrorism Act, we can
have some idea of how well the paper trail actually worked.
B. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002
With the increased focus on protecting the United States from terrorist
attacks, Congress recognized that there is a serious potential threat to our
nation's food supply. The increased nationalization of the food market
has evolved into a system where large quantities of food are produced and
processed in only a few places. From these huge facilities food is then
shipped all over the country to retail establishments such as restaurants and
supermarkets. Congress saw the need for expanded power and funding
for both the FDA and the Department of Agriculture to raise awareness
and standards across the county. The Bioterrorism Act l was enacted "[t]o
improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond
to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies."22 In order to meet
this objective the President's Council on Food Safety was charged with
meeting and coordinating with the various government agencies to address
threats concerning food processing and manufacturing facilities and public
communication in a crisis situation.
2 3
1. Current Agency Models and Jurisdictions Remain Intact.-Under title III of
the Bioterrorism Act, both the current agency structure and jurisdiction are
20 Id.
21 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 18, 21, 29, 38, 42, and
47 U.S.C.).
22 Id.
23 Id. § 301(a) (codified in a note in 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2006)).
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preserved. Various agencies are given directives for their particular areas
of food safety and preparation with regard to concerns for bioterror attacks
on the food supply. Under section 302 the FDA is required to set up and
improve communication with other agencies to protect against adulterated
food.24  This section gives the FDA the authority to carry out this
congressional mandate but requires it to be responsive and to make reports
to certain other agencies and committees of Congress. An advantage of the
reporting requirement is that the FDA is now more accountable to Congress
should there be some lapse or a failure in the system. The FDA gains more
regulatory authority but is also more responsible for properly utilizing that
authority. When enacting the statute, Congress specifically proscribed in
several places that the authority granted by title III to the FDA is not to be
construed in a way that will alter the jurisdiction between the FDA and the
Department of Agriculture. 25 This served to answer concerns that the new
powers granted to the FDA would usurp any authority of the USDA.
2. Appropriations for Agencies to Comply with the Act.-To accomplish its goal
of better protecting the food supply, Congress initially appropriated roughly
$545,250,000 to the various agencies affected by title III of the Bioterrorism
Act.26  The President's Council on Food Safety received $750,000 to
implement its strategy for crisis communication and public education in
regard to threats on the food supply from bioterrorism for the fiscal year
2002 and such sums as necessary for subsequent years.2 7 To protect against
the intentional adulteration of food, Congress appropriated $100,000,000 to
the FDA for the fiscal year 2002 and continuing appropriations as necessary
through the fiscal year 2006.28 Congress also granted $10,000,000 to the
states for the fiscal year 2002 and such sums necessary through 2006 to
conduct inspections2 9 and another $19,500,000 under the same terms for
surveillance,30 all of which is disbursed by the FDA. The Department of
Agriculture was appropriated $30,000,000 for the fiscal year 2002 and further
appropriations for subsequent years to upgrade and expand the capacity of
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service3" and $15,000,000 under
24 Id. § 302 (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 381 (2006)).
25 Id. § 3o8(c) (codified in a note in 21 U.S.C. § 381 (2oo6)); id. § 3 1o(b) (codified in 21
U.S.C. § 398 (2006)); id. § 315 (codified in a note in 21 U.S.C. § 331 (20o6)).
26 Id. § 301(b) (codified in a note in 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2006)); id. § 302(0; id. § 311 (codified
in 21 U.S.C. § 399 (2oo6)); id. § 312 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 247b-20 (2oo6)); id. § 331(c)
(codified in 7 U.S.C. § 8320 (2006)); id. § 332(b) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 679c (2oo6)); id. § 333;
id. § 335(b) (codified in 7 U.S.C. § 3354(b) (2006)) (totaling all individual appropriations in
title III to reach the sum).
27 Id. § 30(b) (codified in a note in 2I U.S.C. § 341 (2oo6)).
28 Id. § 302(0.
29 Id. § 311 (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 399 (2oo6)).
30 Id. § 312 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 247b-20 (2oo6)).
31 Id. § 331(c) (codified in 7 U.S.C. § 8320 (2006)).
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the same terms to upgrade and expand the food safety inspection service.3"
Congress appropriated an additional $180,000,000 for the fiscal year 2002
and funding through 2006 for the purpose of upgrading and modernizing
biosecurity at certain Department of Agriculture facilities.33  The
Department of Agriculture also received $190,000,000 for the fiscal year
2002 with necessary sums in subsequent years in order to conduct research
and development on agricultural bioterrorism.34 The initial appropriation
to enhance the current regulatory authority is actually more than merely
what is explicitly indicated in the statute. There is also a provision allowing
for one-time grants of $50,000 to qualifying universities or colleges and
one-time grants of $100,000 to individual food producing associations to
improve biosecurity.
3s
There are also increased administrative costs associated with increased
administrative authority. Title III expands the administrative detention
authority of the FDA36 which leads to the increased cost of all facets
of detention, including appeals and potential court costs, through the
simple act of enabling detention in more situations. More administrative
detentions mean that there must be more money spent on the detentions.
The FDA is also given greater debarment authority for food import
violations. 37 Given the severe nature of a debarment action, it is likely that
this will generate appeals within the agency and potentially court costs,
thus increasing the amount of money that the FDA must spend to carry out
its new mandates. There are increased registration requirements for "any
facility that is engaged in manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding
food for consumption."3 In order to fulfill this congressional mandate, the
FDA was required to engage in the expensive process of rulemaking.3 9
In conjunction with the new registration requirements there are also,
not surprisingly, new recordkeeping requirements, 4° which also require
rulemaking by the FDA in order to be properly effected. 4' Additionally,
the FDA must also promulgate rules that require all importers of food
into the United States to provide notice that the food is foreign.4 And to
32 Id. § 332(b) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 679c (2oo6)).
33 Id. § 333.
34 Id. § 335(b) (codified in 7 U.S.C. § 3354(b) (zoo6)).
35 Id. § 334 (codified in 7 U.S.C. § 3353 (2oo6)).
36 Id. § 303(a) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2oo6)).
37 Id. § 3o4(e) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 381(k) (2oo6)). Debarment involves the ability of
the FDA to prevent a regulated party from further importing food into the United States.
38 Id. § 305(a) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 35od (2oo6)).
39 Id. § 305(e) (codified in a note in z U.S.C. § 35o(d) (2006)).
40 Id. § 3o6(a) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 350c (zoo6)).
41 Id. § 3o6(d) (codified in a note in 2i U.S.C. § 350c (2006)).
42 Id. § 307(a) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 381(m) (2oo6)); id. § 307(c) (codified in a note in
21 U.S.C. § 381 (2oo6)).
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go along with the various increases in agency authority and ability, there
is necessarily a need for increased manpower to enact and maintain the
various registration, tracking, and enforcement mechanisms. Congress saw
the need for this increase and allowed the agencies to commission other
federal officials to conduct inspections so long as there is an agreement
between the agencies.43 Title III of the Act also allows the agencies to
create electronic monitoring and registration systems to ease the burden
of the new requirements and potentially lower the cost of utilizing other
agencies and adding new personnel.
44
3. FDA Authority Under Title III of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.-Title III of the Act directs the
FDA to increase its protection against adulterated food entering the
food supply.4 Additionally, the FDA is directed to promulgate new rules
regarding registration of food products.' The goal is to permit the FDA
to track suspicious food quickly to its point of origin in the food supply.
Once an outbreak is detected the new registration requirements will allow
the FDA to trace the food from the consumers that are sick back through
grocery stores and shippers to the point where the contaminated items
entered the food supply.
Title III gives the FDA new authority to detain articles of food for
which there is credible evidence or information indicating that it presents a
threat to the health of people or animals. 4' Detention effectively prevents
the food from reaching consumers until the threat can be ascertained by
FDA officials. Under section 303 of the Act, the FDA has the authority
to detain all food which it already had existing jurisdiction over,48 and may
detain food with the approval of the District Director of the district where
the detained food is located or her supervisor.49 Once food is detained, it
must be removed to a secure facility under the conditions specified in the
order and may be held for thirty days, with an exception for perishable
items, and may not be released without FDA permission. 0
The FDA accordingly established new administrative procedures for
appealing a detention order that allows anyone who may claim ownership
of the detained food to appeal. For non-perishable food, a notice of intent
to appeal and request for a hearing must be filed within four days from
43 Id. § 314 (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 372 (2oo6)).
44 Id. § 305(d) (codified in a note in zi U.S.C. § 35od (2oo6)).
45 Id. § 302(a) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 381 (zoo6)).
46 Id. § 305(a) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 35od (2oo6)).
47 Id. § 303(a) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2o6)).
48 Id.; Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(f), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2oo6).
49 21 C.F.R. § 1.391 (2oo8).
50 Id. § 1.379. Under z C.FR. § 1.383, perishable items will be dispensed within four
days, rather than the normal thirty. Id. § 1.383.
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receipt of the detention order.5 The FDA must then conduct an informal
adjudication to determine whether the food may still be detained."
Title III also provides new registration requirements for food facilities. s3
The registration requirements apply to all foreign and domestic facilities that
manufacture, process, pack, or hold food for human or animal consumption
in the United States.54 The definition of food is again consistent with the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and therefore applies to the same
facilities that were subject to FDA jurisdiction prior to the passage of the
Act. Additionally, there are many facilities that do handle food, but are
not subject to registration. Common entities that do not have to register
are private individuals, transport vehicles that operate only as carriers,
farms, restaurants, retail food establishments, fishing vessels, and facilities
regulated by the USDA.55 Facilities subject to registration must provide
general information such as the name, address, and phone number for
the facilities and the names of people in charge at those facilities.5 6 The
information that the FDA requires for registration is not available to the
public and information that would reveal individual persons is not even
available under the Freedom of Information Act.57 Failure to register
a facility that is covered by the Act constitutes a prohibited act and the
FDA may file for civil or criminal sanctions against the party that fails to
register.58 Thus if there is some act of biotcrrorism or adulteration of the
food produced at an unregistered facility, the FDA can impose penalties for
failing to register and hindering the ability to track the source of the initial
contamination.
Title III also requires those facilities that are required to register with the
FDA to maintain records for a period of no more than two years depending
on the type of food at that facility.59 The records that are required to be
kept are those that identify the immediate previous source and immediate
subsequent recipient of the food produced by the facility." This effectively
creates an easy to follow paper trail that allows the FDA to quickly and
efficiently trace any potentially contaminated food item through the
production chain to the original source of contamination. The requirement
to maintain such records extends further than the requirement to register
51 Id. § 1.402.
52 Id. § 1.403.
53 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 305(a), 116 Stat. 594,667-68 (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 35od (2006)).
54 21 C.F.R. § 1.225.
55 Id. § 1.226.
56 Id. § 1.232.
57 Id. § 1.243.
58 Id. § 1.241; 21 U.S.C. § 331(dd) (2oo6).
59 21 C.F.R. § 1.36o.
60 Id. § 1.337, 1.345, 1-352-
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the facility with the FDA. Some additional facilities that must maintain
records of the food sources are retail establishments. These entities are
exempt from the requirement of keeping record of the recipient of the
food,61 for the obvious reason that this would require keeping track of
individual consumers.
Additionally, the rule requires that different records be maintained by
those defined as transporters than those defined as non-transporters. Non-
transporters of food, such as those who merely hold the food or those who
actually process and pack food, must identify both the immediate non-
transporter previous source of the food and the immediate non-transporter
subsequent recipient of the food.6" These entities are essentially the
facilities that handle the food. Transporters of food must also keep track of
the facility that the food was shipped from and that which it was shipped
to.63 Transporters must also maintain records of the specific route of
movement that the food followed and any transfer points that the food
passed through.64
The records themselves must be maintained "at a reasonably accessible
location" and preferably on-site. 65 Should the FDA require access to the
records, they must be produced within twenty-four hours from the time of
receipt of the official request. 66 Ideally, the information would be produced
almost immediately in the case of a potential bioterror attack. Additionally,
the failure to maintain these records qualifies as a prohibited act according
to FDA guidelines and this allows the FDA to seek judicial remedies if an
entity is found to be failing in maintaining the appropriate records.
67
Because these registration requirements are new to foods under FDA
authority, there were many concerns voiced during the notice and comment
phase of the rulemaking process. One important concern that the FDA
addressed was the potential benefit of the new record establishment
and maintenance system. 68 While the FDA cautions that its estimates
of benefits are only fully realized in the context of an outbreak of a
foodborne pathogen due to the unknown probability of a bioterror attack,
it emphasizes that the increased traceback ability will help in the event of
61 Id. § 1.327.
62 Id. §§ 1.337, 1.345.
63 Id. § 1.352.
64 Id.
65 Id. § 1.36o.
66 Id. § 1.361.
67 Id. § 1.363.
68 Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,562, 71,614-15 (Dec.
9, 2004) (addressing comments raised in industry regarding various aspects of the record
maintenance and retention requirements of the Act).
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an attack.69 Among the most important benefits of the recordkeeping rule
is that it enhances food safety and security.70 The agency will be able to
ascertain and investigate outbreaks much more quickly now that it will not
be hampered by incomplete or nonexistent records at food facilities.7 This
is especially important because there are so many potential places where
an outbreak or bioterror attack could enter the food supply, such as on the
farm, during distribution, during processing, and even at the retail level.7"
The records allow the FDA to fully complete more investigations and to
perform the investigations faster, which will lead to the ability to shore up
any weaknesses in the recordkeeping system and potentially identify other
possible sources of contamination.73
The two major advantages of the recordkeeping system with regard
to bioterror attacks are the ability to mitigate an ongoing attack and
to identify a hoax.7 4 With regard to mitigation of a bioterror attack, the
FDA will be able to quickly identify the chain in which the contaminated
food traveled.75 Once the food is identified, the thoroughness and easy
availability of the records will allow the FDA to quickly determine the
scope of the contamination and thus reduce the risk to the health of the
public.7 6 Because there will be more records available at the time of crisis,
the FDA can also determine if a bioterror attack is small or even a hoax.
The FDA presents the scenario of a small contamination that is boasted
by a terrorist to affect the entire nation.77 With the ability to quickly and
accurately traceback a product through the entire supply chain, the FDA
can identify a false claim swiftly.78 This will prevent the loss of large
amounts of perfectly good food and allow consumers to have confidence in
both the food supply and the government's ability to regulate it.79
69 Id. at 71,614.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 71,615.
79 Id.
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II. CRITICS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. Issues and Problems That Remain Unresolved
While the FDA has recently taken steps to try to ascertain the extent and
nature of the problem of E. coli contamination, there is some question as to
just how much the FDA can do. Shortly before the FDA reported that there
was an outbreak of E. coli in the spinach and warned consumers not to eat it,
the agency had launched a broad investigation into the repeated outbreaks
of E. coli that were linked to the Salinas Valley. 0 Part of the problem is
the length of time it takes to recognize that there has actually been an
outbreak, and often, once an initial point of origin has been established, the
field has already been plowed to make it ready for the next crop."' Plowing
hinders investigative efforts because researchers are left to speculate on
the actual causes of the outbreaks due to simple lack of evidence. Thus,
there are many theories as to the source of E. coli bacteria ranging from soil
contamination to birds and wildlife feeding on cow manure and spreading
the bacteria to other fields.8" These difficulties force the FDA and other
agencies into a responsive role rather than a proactive one. Because there is
not yet any clear determination of the extent of the problem, there is little
that the agency could do in enforcing new mandatory rules simply because
there is no way of telling whether they will be effective. Occasionally, the
FDA has found it necessary to seek out criminal sanctions against producers,
and an investigation exploring that option is underway in the current E.
coli outbreak. 3 However, considering that the voluntary practices require
farmers to "maximize their efforts to minimize contamination," 84 it seems
extremely difficult to impose serious criminal sanctions, and the most likely
result would be some sort of fine if there was a violation.
Critics of the current system point to many problems in the wake of
the recent E. coli outbreak. One common concern is the lack of a singular
regulatory voice in the area of food safety. The Department of Agriculture
generally oversees the production of meat and poultry while the Department
of Health and Human Services, through the FDA, oversees what is essentially
the remainder of the food supply.85 This gives rise to a situation where
both jurisdiction and funding are decidedly different within what would
80 Rong-Gong Lin II, E. Coli Spurs Review of Lettuce Farms; Salinas Valley Growers' Practices
are being Evaluated by State and Federal Health Officials After Products' Link to Repeated Outbreaks,
L.A. TMES, Sept. I , 2oo6, at B i.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Gardiner Harris & Libby Sander, U.S. Opens Criminal Inquiry on Health Measures Taken
by Spinach Growers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, zoo6, at A2o.
84 Id.
85 Shin, At E. Coli Hunt's End, a Safety Standards Gap, supra note i i.
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seemingly be the same task of ensuring food safety. Ideally, this division
of labor would work smoothly with both agencies receiving comparable
manpower and financing, but in reality the FDA lags far behind in both
aspects. The Department of Agriculture oversees roughly 6,000 meat and
poultry facilities nationwide with over 7,000 inspectors8 6 and performs
daily inspections on the production floor.87 The FDA lags far behind with
less than 2,000 inspectors responsible for more than 120,000 production
facilities nationwide.88 Adding to the problems for the FDA is the fact that
many cows graze close to produce fields in California.8 9 Because the FDA
has no authority over the cattle industry, it can do nothing to regulate the
proximity of cattle to green leafy vegetables and thus a substantial cause
of contamination remains simply because of the difference in jurisdiction
between the agencies. Another problem cited is the lack of recall power
of the FDA.' This problem was evident in the recent E. coli outbreak as
the FDA could merely caution people not to eat the spinach and relied on
a voluntary recall from Natural Selection Foods.91
There have also been repeated calls to modernize the current system.
One of the problems continually focused upon is the extreme lack of
centralization. While the FDA and Department of Agriculture regulate
the majority of the food in the country, it is the EPA that is responsible for
determining how much pesticide may be used, the CDC covers food-borne
illness, and the Fisheries Service in the Department of Commerce oversees
some seafood inspections.9" Even with the new provisions and programs
in the Act, the duplicity of regulation and jurisdiction that remains in the
current system is unlikely to change unless there is some defining national
problem that substantially alters the food supply in a way similar to the
mad cow scare that caused the United Kingdom to unify its food safety
departments.93 And even with the United Kingdom in the middle of a food
crisis, it still took roughly three years for the new independent food safety
agency to become fully functional.'
86 Marian Burros, Tainted Spinach Brings Demands for New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2006, at F5.
87 Shin, At E. Coli Hunt's End, a Safety Standards Gap, supra note I i.
88 Burros, supra note 86.
89 Id.
90 Shin, At E. Coli Hunt' End, a Safety Standards Gap, supra note i i.
91 Julia Preston & Monica Davey, Possible Source of Bad Spinach is Named as Outbreak
Widens, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 16, 2oo6, at Ai.
92 Michael R. Taylor, Lead or React? A Game Plan for Modernizing the Food Safety System in
the United States, 59 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 400 (2004).
93 Id. at 401.
94 John Krebs, Establishing a Single, Independent Food Standards Agency: The United
Kingdom ' Experience, 59 FooD & DRUG L.J. 387, 388 (2004).
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Some groups simply wish for an increase in funding for the FDA.
They point to the decrease in funding and staff between 2003 and 2006
and the increasing risk of contamination as clear evidence of a need for
change.9" The funding that has been available to the FDA following the
initial increases in 2003 has not been increased or even kept at pace with
inflation.96 Thus, the increased burden placed upon the agency by the Act
has not been adequately funded by Congress. The simple lack of funding
and decreased staffing leads directly to the current situation where some
facilities can literally go years without an inspection by the FDA.97
Additionally, both the FDA and USDA lack statutory authority to
conduct a mandatory recall of food.98 The voluntary recalls issued by the
FDA and USDA really only work on the implicit threat that an agency
will take some regulatory action against the private actor if the actor fails
to voluntarily recall its product from the market. 99 Unfortunately, the
threats that the agency can make do not necessarily cause a speedy recall
because many of the serious sanctions, such as an injunction or criminal
court proceeding, require the assistance of a court.1°° One of the main
obstacles in the face of mandatory recall authority has been Congress's
failure to allow the agencies to issue such recalls. 0 1 A mandatory system
would likely help the situation, but there remains the problem of funding.
Making rules mandatory instead of voluntary works no real change unless
the FDA has more funding and officials to ensure that the mandatory rules
are followed.
Additionally, if a mandatory recall were issued, some sort of agency
hearing would have to occur. In one model, the agency would issue its
mandatory recall and then the affected company could request an informal
hearing, at which time the agency would then only be allowed to stop
further distribution pending the hearing.10 2 The problem with this solution
is that the recall does not really occur because the products in the market
simply stay there. The mandatory recall would amount to a mere hold on
dispersing the products with no effect on those products already in the
market. Thus, it seems likely that mandatory recall authority will require
Congress to solve both the process problem and the finance problem
associated with granting the agencies mandatory recall authority. While
95 Burros, supra note 86.
96 Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Spinach Scare's Larger Warning; Tight FDA Budgets have Cut
Produce Inspection. Compliance with Safety Rules is Voluntary. L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2oo6, at AI.
97 Id.
98 Michael T Roberts, Mandatory Recall Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist Approach to
Improving Food Safety, 59 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 563,567 (2004).
99 Id. at 567-68.
i oo Id. at 568.
ioi Id. at 576.
102 Roberts, supra note 98, at 579.
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other agencies receive plenty of support from Congress in the issuance of
recalls, it seems that the food industry still is not on the congressional radar
for granting such authority.'0 3
The many problems faced by the food industry over the years and
the increased concern over a possible attack upon the food supply have
brought an increasingly vigorous call for reform. As reports of food
contamination outbreaks increase, that call will likely get stronger. The
question remaining is whether the public or the administration will find a
way to convince Congress to unify food safety. However, there are many
competing interests that would likely wish for the current system to remain
in place. Both the FDA and Department of Agriculture have an interest in
keeping their systems and personnel in place and, logically, regulated parties
also share that interest. Agencies generally develop a working relationship
with the parties that they regulate and these parties are often interested
in maintaining a regulatory status quo so they do not have to change their
operations. Creating a new food safety agency and removing this power
from the existing agencies would likely meet great resistance from both
the current agencies and regulated parties. Consequently there has not
been a great deal of movement in Congress pushing toward a unified food
safety system, but there has been one Senator who has repeatedly tried
to convince the rest of the legislature of the need for a single food safety
agency.
B. The Current Proposalfor an Independent Federal Food Safety Agency
One prominent proponent of a unified food safety agency has been Senator
Richard Durbin who has sought to create a single, independent agency since
1996. "° Senator Durbin proposes to create a brand new, full and independent
regulatory agency complete with head administrators appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.'05 This agency would be separate
from both the FDA and the USDA with the goal of"streamlin[ing] policy in
ways that more effectively address food safety hazards without feeling tied
to the past policies of [either agency]."' ' 6 Senator Durbin recognizes that
the current agencies are often stuck with rules once they are promulgated
and a change in regulatory course requiring at least informal rulemaking
may be too costly a process for the agency to endeavor. The main thrust
of Senator Durbin's argument is that the new agency, once created, will
save time and money by eliminating the redundancies that exist in the
103 Id. at 577-78.
104 Richard J. Durbin, Food Safety Oversight for the z2st Century: The Creation of a Single,
Independent Federal Food Safety Agency, 59 FooD & DRUG L.J. 383, 383 (2004).
Io5 Id. at 384.
io6 Id.
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current food regulation system. 107 The Government Accountability Office
agrees with his position to the extent that it sees redundancy in the current
system and seeks to fix such problems." 8
The Food Marketing Institute (FMI), a nonprofit association of food
retailers, wholesalers, and distributors, agrees with Senator Durbin's
position.10 9 One concern of this interest group is the ability to disseminate
information to the public, arguing that a lack of a single agency creates a
situation where there is no single spokesperson or agency who can quickly
ascertain a problem and reassure the public regarding that problem."'
Additionally, the FMI sees the current system of multiple agencies,
departments within those agencies, and the further regulation of state
governments as creating a counterproductive competition for regulatory
power.' 1 Because each agency must fight for its own current budget and
has specific congressionally mandated areas of regulation, there is little
incentive for the current agencies to reduce the redundancy.'
Senator Durbin currently sponsors a bill in the Senate that would
establish a single food safety agency that combines all of the food safety
power currently granted to various agencies, including the FDA and USDA,
and establish a "Food Safety Administration to protect the public health
by preventing food-borne illness, ensuring the safety of food, improving
research on contaminants leading to food-borne illness, and improving
security of food from intentional contamination, and for other purposes."' 3
The bill also foresees the potential cost problem of creating a new agency
from scratch. While the bill authorizes appropriation of sums as necessary,"4
it specifically limits the amount appropriated to the aggregated budget of
the constituent parts that would become the new agency.1 5 This provision
makes this new agency almost a pure reorganization of the existing structure,
and this would likely appeal to those who do not wish to simply increase
funding for the food safety portion of the government in order to achieve
107 Id.
1o8 Federal Food Safety and Security System: Fundamental Restructuring is Needed to Address
Fragmentation and Overlap: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil Serv. and Agency Organization
of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, i o8th Cong. 17-18 (2004), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/do4588t.pdf (statement of Lawrence J Dyckman, Director, Natural Resources
and Environment, Government Accountability Office).
109 Timothy M. Hammonds, It is Time to Designate a Single Food Safey Agency, 59 FooD
& DRUG L.J. 427, 427 (2004) ("FMI has proposed the creation of a single food safety agency
because we believe new challenges have arisen that, taken together, threaten to overwhelm
the ability of the current regulatory system to respond effectively").
iio Id. at 428.
iii Id. at 430.
112 Id.
113 Safe Food Act of 2007, S. 654, 1 ioth Cong. (2007).
114 Id. § 5o8.
115 Id. § 509.
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positive results. While it may cost several billion dollars to change over and
run the new agency in the first year, this appropriation will theoretically be
money that is already being spent and thus will not be a new cost for the
government.
One of the major changes that this agency will oversee is the vast transfer
of power from other agencies to the new Food Safety Administration
(FSA). The administration would be in charge of the transfer of power of
several divisions of other agencies to the new agency."6 Presumably the
existing facilities will remain intact but simply answer to a different agency
authority. Additionally, there will be new performance standards established
by agency rulemaking for the levels of contaminants in food117 and new
inspection power to ensure that the standards are followed.'"8 It appears
that the goal of these sections is to increase the visibility and frequency
of inspections to promote a safer food supply at the processing and retail
level. Another interesting requirement of the new bill is that it establishes
a statutorily mandated traceback requirement to trace food "from point of
origin to retail sale."' 19 While this section of the bill is sparse and would
require potentially significant rulemaking, it is a step in the right direction
toward the goal of being able to quickly and efficiently find the source of
any breakouts of contamination in the food supply. A potential change
that this section might enact would be to require prior and subsequent
food facilities or transporters to be listed physically on the package rather
than merely in a record at each facility. While this is certainly feasible for
bulk items and might aid identification at the retail level, it does not seem
plausible for a pack of gum.
Some of the elements of the new agency will remain the same and
potentially there will not be a great deal ofchange needed. One such element
is registration requirements. Under the new program food establishments
will be required to register with the agency,' but much of the information
that is required is substantially the same as that already required under the
Bioterrorism Act. What is unclear is whether this information will be able
to be transferred easily to the new agency, or if there will be a need for a
i6 Id. § io2 (including the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the USDA, the
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition of the FDA, egg surveillance services under
the Egg Products Inspection Act, the Office of Regulatory Affairs of the FDA that administer
inspections, the Center for Veterinary Medicine of the FDA, the facilities of the EPA that
regulate pesticide residues in food, the part of the Research, Education, and Economics
mission area of the USDA related to food safety and animal feed research, the part of the
National Marine Fisheries Service of the NOAA that administers seafood inspection, the
Animal and Plant Inspection Health Service of the USDA, and other agencies designated by
Executive Order to carry out the Act).
1'7 Id.§ 2o4.
i18 Id.§ 2o5.
19 Id.§2zo.
120 Id. § 2o2.
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new, costly rulemaking procedure to enact the registration requirements
under the new system. There will also continue to be public education
functions" ' and funding for research projects.' Again it seems likely that
the existing infrastructure will be utilized, but the agency would likely
have to create some new regulations.
One of the major changes in the proposed Food Safety Administration
is that it will have mandatory recall authority, unlike the current situation
in the FDA and USDA. The FSA will not be allowed to issue a mandatory
recall until a voluntary recall has been attempted," 3 but the ability to
conduct a mandatory recall would be a huge increase in the authority of
the agency. Without this ability to exercise greater control over potentially
contaminated sources of food, the new agency would be little more than
a reorganization of the existing agencies. In addition to mandatory recall
authority, the FSA would also oversee regular, unannounced inspections of
food establishments2 4 that will better enable the agency to "enforce the
adoption of process controls in food establishments .... 125
The FSA would also oversee and enforce new preventative process
controls and performance standards for food facilities as developed through
agency regulations.126 The purpose of adding new process controls is to
ensure that the food is produced and handled in a sanitary manner to
reduce food contamination and adulteration. This will allow for the FSA
to promulgate regulations that require food establishments to adopt the
controls'27 and to ensure that they maintain records of compliance.12 8 With
the authority to conduct inspections, the FSA will also ensure that the
records are readily accessible129 and will be able to test and sample the
products in order to ensure that the process controls are effective and in
compliance at the facility.130
In accordance with new process controls, the FSA will establish
performance standards to objectively determine if the new regulations are
being complied with by food establishments. These standards will operate
with regard to the level of protection from food-borne contaminants.'
The standards will include the level of a contaminant "that can safely and
121 Id.§ 302.
122 Id. § 303.
123 Id. § 4o 3(b)(2).
124 Id. § zo (C)(1).
125 Id. § 201(C)(2).
126 Id. §§ 203, 204.
127 Id. § 203(b)().
128 Id. § 203(b)(4).
129 Id. § 2o3(b)(6).
130 Id. § zo 3 (b)( 5 ).
131 Id. § 204(b)(2).
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lawfully be present in food,"' 32 and process standards for processed food. 33
An addition to this section is the ability of the FSA to enforce its standards.1
34
If the agency determines that the standards were not met or remedied
upon an inspection, then the agency has several sanction measures at its
disposal. 3 5 The FSA will have the ability to "detain, seize, or condemn
food" that fails to meet the standards, 13 6 order a mandatory recall of food
from the facility, 37 increase the frequency of inspections, 38 "withdraw the
mark of inspection" that shows that the food is approved by the agency,13 9
and even to withdrawal registration of the facility effectively shutting it
down. 40 These controls and abilities will help the FSA to ensure that there
is a higher quality standard and that food facilities operate at a higher level
of compliance with the regulations.
III. Is THE CURRENT SYSTEM WORKING OR IS A NEW AGENCY NECESSARY?
Judging from the example of the recent outbreaks of E. coli in spinach and
lettuce we can examine how the requirements of title III of the Bioterrorism
Act have functioned. Once the FDA was able to ascertain that there was an
outbreak and the product that the outbreak was linked to, it only took a few
days to perform the traceback function and for the FDA to find out exactly
where the contamination entered the food supply.'4' While the search did
take several days, it is important to note that the FDA was able to isolate
the exact product, its origin, and where it had been distributed throughout
the country. 42 This is exactly the type of ability that was contemplated
when the registration and document maintenance portions of the Act were
passed. Had this been a deliberate contamination of the food supply, the
process would have worked.
The main difficulty in isolating the source of contamination is no longer
the traceback function, but it is the determination that there is, in fact,
an outbreak. It took over a week for the various cases across the country
to be linked through the data systems maintained to monitor diseases
throughout the country. 43 This portion of finding an outbreak still relies
132 Id. § 204(c)(i)(A).
133 Id. § 2o4(c)(i)(C).
134 Id. § 2o4(d)(I).
135 Id. § zo4(d)(z).
136 Id. § 2o4(d)(2)(A).
137 Id. § 204(d)(2)(B).
138 Id. § 2o4(d)(2)(C).
139 Id. § 204(d)(2)(D).
140 Id. § 204(d)(2)(E).
141 See La Ganga, supra note 5.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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upon individuals in state and local agencies across the country to place
information online so others can search for a pattern. Thus, the real
difficulty in detecting an outbreak is still a major issue to deal with.
Although the registration requirements led to a swift determination of
the source of the contamination once an outbreak was discovered, the FDA
was unable to do anything but issue a press release suggesting a recall. If
the FDA had mandatory recall authority it might have been able to act more
quickly and recall the affected food, thus preventing some people from
becoming ill. Although the FDA now has broader authority to detain food,
it is limited to detention only when an FDA official issues a detention order
"during an inspection, examination, or investigation."1" If the FDA had
the ability to temporarily detain food for 24-48 hours without an inspection
in situations of an outbreak or bioterror attack to perform the traceback
function, it might be able to prevent further spread of the contamination
without unduly affecting food that is not contaminated.
Both mandatory recall authority and temporary detention are powers
present in the proposal for a new Food Safety Administration. In addition
to the added authority, the FSA would also centralize all of the various
agencies into one. This would have the effect of creating a single, powerful
agency that would no longer have to struggle for authority and financial
support at the expense of other agencies performing the same functions.
The major drawback for private parties is that they already are familiar with
the regulations and polices of the FDA, USDA, and other agencies. There
would likely be a difficult transition phase during which various industries
would become accustomed to the new policies developed under the FSA.
While the reorganization of the various government agencies into one
central agency would certainly simplify the process of determining which
agency's regulations to comply with, it is not clear that the agency would
perform the functions designed to prevent a bioterror attack with any more
efficiency than they are already performed. Since the major difficulty in
containing outbreaks and bioterror attacks is the actual identification of
contaminated food, it does not appear that any of the broader powers of
the FSA would substantially benefit this ability. Certainly the FDA would
greatly benefit from mandatory recall authority and greater detention power
and these provisions should have been included in the Act when Congress
granted the FDA additional power. Additionally, the great lack of funding
of the FDA severely limits its ability to perform its duties. Thus there is not
so much a need for a new agency that centralizes all food safety, as there is a
need for Congress to grant the current agencies the power and appropriate
the finances necessary to properly perform their existing functions. The
records system is working as it is designed and will certainly help save lives
144 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 303(a), 1 16 Stat. 594, 663 (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 334(h) (zoo6)).
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in the event of a bioterror attack, and it can only work better if Congress
grants the FDA the ability to fulfill its duty.
CONCLUSION
The additional power granted to the FDA under title III of the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 has
produced a regulatory system that works as designed to trace contaminated
food to the original source of contamination quickly and efficiently. In
terms of the structure set up under title III, any reorganization into a new
Food Safety Administration would be little more than a reorganization of
the existing structures that are functioning as designed. However, the lack
of FDA power to issue a mandatory recall of contaminated food is a serious
drawback. While the existing requirements allow food to be traced better
than ever, without the addition of mandatory recall authority the FDA is
limited in the action it can take to stop contaminated food from moving
further along the food supply chain. Whether it be a unified Food Safety
Administration with mandatory recall power or an additional grant of power
to the FDA, the utility of the enhanced tracing powers will continue to be
limited without mandatory recall authority.
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